Wisconsin gains jurisdiction over a person when:

 (a) The person commits a crime, any of the constituent elements of which takes place in this state.
(b) While out of this state, the person aids and abets, conspires with, or advises, incites, commands, or solicits another to commit a crime in this state.
(c) While out of this state, the person does an act with intent that it cause in this state a consequence set forth in a section defining a crime.
(d) While out of this state, the person steals and subsequently brings any of the stolen property into this state.
(e) The person violates s. 943.201 or 943.203 and the victim, at the time of the violation, is an individual who resides in this state, a deceased individual who resided in this state immediately before his or her death, or an entity, as defined in s. 943.203 (1) (a), that is located in this state.
(f) The person violates s. 943.89 and the matter or thing is deposited for delivery within this state or is received or taken within this state.
(g) The person violates s. 943.90 and the transmission is from within this state, the transmission is received within this state, or it is reasonably foreseeable that the transmission will be accessed by a person or machine within this state.   Wis. Stat. Sec. 939.03.
 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has characterized § 939.03 as relating to the personal jurisdiction of the court.  State v. Smith 131 Wis. 2d 220, 239,240, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).  See also, Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350, 359-60.  The limitations in § 939.30 assure a sufficient relationship between the defendant and the State of Wisconsin to constitutionally exercise authority over him.  Id. at 239.
 
A question arises about how Wisconsin gains jurisdiction over someone not living in Wisconsin.  Normally, that is gained by the extradition process.  U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, cl.2, provides: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."  See also, Uniform Acts in Criminal Proceedings, Wis. Stat. Chap. 976.  There were early challenges to this uniform act when it was adopted in states but it was found constitutional despite going farther than what was provided in the Constitution.  State v. Kriss, 62 A. 2d 568 (Md. 1948); People v. Herberich, 276 App. Div. 852, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 272 (1949) aff'd mere., 301 N. Y. 614, 93 N. E. 2d 913 (1950); English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N. E. 2d 898 (1947).
 
Sometimes law enforcement does not like to have to follow legal procedures.  The question then arises can law enforcement kidnap someone in one state and force them to appear in another state?  The person who is thus kidnapped and brought for trial into the state having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the crime may urge that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (or, if it has jurisdiction, that it should not exercise this jurisdiction) in view of the illegal manner in which his presence in the state was obtained. In the reported cases he usually raises this issue of jurisdiction over the person either in the trial court by a plea to the jurisdiction, or by applying after the abduction for a writ of habeas corpus in a state or federal court.  Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 12(b) (2), it has been held that a kidnapped defendant must challenge personal jurisdiction by a pre-trial motion; it is too late to raise the issue by a motion in arrest of judgment after verdict. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F. 2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952). Failure to raise the point early constitutes a waiver. Id. 
 
It is of particular note that early decisions found that where a defendant was properly in custody on a federal case, he could be brought before a state court for trial.  Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254 (1922).  Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has found nothing in the U.S. Constitution from stopping one state from kidnapping a person and forcing him to appear in another state for trial.  Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700 (1888). Two justices dissented on the ground that the Constitution "clearly implies that there shall be no resort to force." Id. at 716. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 (1886) (where police can be held liable civilly to the victim for false imprisonment or assault and battery, no need to forbid a trial under the due process clause of the kidnapped person.).  A later case dealing with federal control over state jurisdiction over a defendant abducted from another state, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952), did not mention the extradition provisions of the Constitution or statutes.  The Frisbie decision was reached despite 18 U.S. Code § 1201. Kidnapping (Lindbergh Law) which provides severe criminal penalties for “[w]hoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person …when the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of whether the person was alive when transported across a State boundary, or the offender travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.”  See also, 34 U.S.C. § 12601 which makes it unlawful for State or local law enforcement officers to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.  The types of conduct covered by this law can include, among other things, excessive force, discriminatory harassment, false arrests, coercive sexual conduct, and unlawful stops, searches or arrests. However, in order to be covered by this law, the misconduct must constitute a "pattern or practice" -- it may not simply be an isolated incident.  Thus, one incident of kidnapping is permissible.
 
What of the due process clause which provides the government "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"?  The due process clause, as applied to state criminal procedure, has been said to embrace "principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1935).  Due process requires all that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937). and, as applied to state criminal procedure, "denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.”  Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941).  Doesn’t kidnapping someone in one state and forcing him to appear in another state violate due process?  In short answer, the Frisbie court said prior decisions denying any due process violation by such action "rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a [state] court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will."  Frisbie at 522.  All the process that is due a person is to be notified of the charges and get a fair trial.  See also, Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) where Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito, held the existence of a valid arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the contraband.  Thus, police have a free pass to violate the rights of individuals — just so long as they find evidence of a ‘crime.’  Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined in full, where she argued that the majority's ruling "creates unfortunate incentives for the police"
 
Since federal law permits illegal conduct by the police to bring a person into court, what of state law?  Some states originally barred kidnapping in the name of law enforcement.  For instance in State v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888), the court stated: "It would not be proper for the courts of this state to favor, or even to tolerate, breaches of the peace committed by their own officers, in a sisterstate... [Jurisdiction should not be sustained when obtained only] in violation of some well-recognized rule of honesty or fair dealing, as by force or fraud .. . [Such jurisdiction] would not only be a special wrong against the individual .. .but it would also be a general wrong against society itself a violation of those fundamental principles of mutual trust and confidence which lie at the very foundation of all organized society, and which are necessary in the very nature of things to hold society together" 18 Pac. at 178-9.  Simmons was overruled by implication in Foster v. Hudspeth, 170 Kan. 338, 224 P. 2d 987 (1950),
 
Sadly, Wisconsin, like many states, does not see a problem with police breaking the law to enforce the law..  In State v. Smith, supra., it was held that “an illegal arrest as a jurisdictional defect is not a constitutional mandate. A defendant cannot claim immunity from prosecution "simply because his appearance in court was precipitated by an unlawful arrest," nor does an illegal arrest serve as a defense to a valid conviction.”  State v. Smith at 236.

The criminal system is a blunt tool used to deal with society’s most delicate problems.

Delicate meaning difficult.  Delicate meaning complex.  Delicate meaning misunderstood.

Problems meaning everything from violence between strangers and family, drug (including alcohol) abuse, theft, homelessness, and the poor.

One of the most common delicate social problems the criminal system is called upon to address is caring for persons who have a mental disease or defect.  According to the Treatment Advocacy Center, “Serious mental illness has become so prevalent in the US corrections system that jails and prisons are now commonly called “the new asylums.” In point of fact, the Los Angeles County Jail, Chicago’s Cook County Jail, or New York’s Riker’s Island Jail each hold more mentally ill inmates than any remaining psychiatric hospital in the United States. Overall, approximately 20% of inmates in jails and 15% of inmates in state prisons are now estimated to have a serious mental illness. Based on the total inmate population, this means approximately 383,000 individuals with severe psychiatric disease were behind bars in the United States in 2014 or nearly 10 times the number of patients remaining in the nation’s state hospitals. . . .A 2004–2005 survey found there were ‘more than three times more seriously mentally ill persons in jails and prisons than in hospitals.’”  Moreover the Treatment Advocacy Center found that mentally ill inmates remain in jail longer than other inmates, cost more to house than other inmates, cause problems that too often result in stays in solitary confinement, and are more likely than other inmates to commit suicide.

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections in May 2018 published its “inmate profile for 2017.”  This publication identified 37% of males and 84% of females as having a “mental health condition.”  The Department of Corrections 2019-21 budget request indicates that among the serious mental illnesses affecting inmates are “major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, psychotic disorders, and behavioral disorders, which significantly impact the inmate’s ability to function effectively.” 

According to Mental Illness Policy, in Wisconsin as of 2005, there were 36,154 prisoners in jail and prison, the estimated number of those prisoners who were seriously mentally ill was  5785, the number of patients in state or private psychiatric units in general hospitals was 1500 meaning that the odds of a seriously mentally ill person being in a Wisconsin jail or prison compared to in a hospital was 3.9 to 1.  This means that is Wisconsin, more mentally ill persons are in jails and prisons than hospitals.

Using the blunt force of the criminal system to warehouse people is costly to taxpayers.  According to a 2014 study of Los Angeles County, the average cost of jailing an individual with serious mental illness exceeds $48,500 per year. By comparison, the price tag for providing Assertive Community Treatment, or ACT, and supportive housing—one of the most intensive, comprehensive, and successful intervention models in use today—amounts to less than $20,500 annually, just two-fifths the cost of jail.

These numbers are staggering in and of themselves.  However, what is really important from these numbers is what is not said.  All these facts and figures relate directly to mental illness with nothing said about prisoners with a mental defect like intellectual disability.  So it is clear, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders version 4 (DSM-IV), there was a diagnostic category called "mental retardation." When the new DSM-5 came out in 2013, mental retardation had disappeared; in its place was a new disorder called "intellectual development disorder." This change likely was influenced by congressional action in October 2010 with the passing of Rosa's Law, which required references to “mental retardation” in specified Federal laws to become “intellectual disability,” and references to “a mentally retarded individual” to “an individual with an intellectual disability.” Public Law 111-256.

Rosa's Law is part of a long line of changes that has been ongoing since the early 1900s. Words such as idiot and moron were common in court documents and diagnosis throughout the early 1900s for intellectually disabled persons. See, e.g., Biennial Report of the Commission for Segregation and Control of the Feeble-Minded. This early belief has contributed to this nation's mistreatment of intellectually disabled people which has been described as 'grotesque' by five members of the Supreme Court. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3262 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J.); id. at 3266 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.). In the 1960s, changes in the law led to the use of such terms as mental retardation. With the loss of idiot (IQ 0-25), imbecile (IQ 26-50) and moron (IQ 51-75), specific descriptors of IQ-based intelligence were abandoned because of negative public sentiment. Under Rosa's law, these would be described respectively as moderate, profound, and severe levels of intellectual disability. See Letter of Senators Barbara A. Mikulski and Mike B. Enzi urging fellow senators to adopt “Rosa’s Law.”

Intellectually disabled persons often “look normal” and learn to mask their deficits even while suffering from a disability that delays learning, diminishes memory, curtails problem solving and distorts the understanding of cause and effect.  A person with significant intellectual deficits lacks a normal person's ability to reason and understand simple relationships (both similarities and differences) and therefore cannot relate to others on an equal footing.  See generally, White, Critical Influences in the origins of competence, 21 Merrill-Palmer Q 243, 246 (1975), as cited in the amicus brief for the APA in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) at p. 6.  In a nutshell, he is profoundly impaired.  Being intellectually disabled leads to severely debilitated decision making. The result is a person who may appear normal but is, in fact, a very vulnerable person, particularly within the confines of the criminal justice system. See James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1985).

For example, many intellectually disabled people are predisposed to 'biased responding' or answering in the affirmative questions regarding behaviors they believe are desirable, and answering in the negative questions concerning behaviors they believe are prohibited. See generally Sigdman, Budd, Stankel & Schoenrock, When in Doubt, Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews with Mentally Retarded Persons, 19 MENTAL RETARDATION 53 (1980) The form of a question can also directly affect the likelihood of receiving a biased response, Sigelman, Winer & Schoenrock, The Responsiveness of Mentally Retarded Persons to Questions, 17 EDUC. & TRAINING MENTALLY RETARDED 120, 123 (1982); Budd, Sigelman & Sigelman, Exploring the Outer Limits of Response Bias, 14 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS 297, 305-06 (1981), and thus police officers, judges, and lawyers may inadvertently or intentionally cause the susceptible intellectually disabled accused person to answer in an inaccurate manner by asking a question in an inappropriate form. Further, many intellectually disabled persons are reluctant to resist questioners by refusing to answer questions that are beyond their ability. Kernan & Sabsay, Getting There: Directions Given by Mildly Retarded and Nonretarded Adults, in LIVES IN PROCESS: MILDLY RETARDED ADULTS IN A LARGE CITY (R. Edgerton ed. 1984) (Mentally retarded persons were asked for directions to their homes. Fifty-five percent of the sample gave directions which, although complete, proved inaccurate in significant ways.)

According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics report, 30% of jail inmates reported having a cognitive disability—far higher than among the general public, where less than 5% of people self-report a cognitive disability.  This is clear overrepresentation of person’s with a intellectual disability.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics notes this number is an underestimation based on the limits of the questioning.  Id.  Cognitive disabilities—such as Down syndrome, autism, dementia, intellectual disabilities, and learning disorders—are among the most commonly reported.  Id.
So why are so many people with disabilities arrested?  Several factors can lead to higher rates of arrest for people with cognitive disabilities, including:

• The ARC explains that people with low IQ and other developmental disabilities can engender suspicion because they lack the necessary social cues that other adults understand, resulting in inappropriate responses—such as becoming overwhelmed by the police presence and running away or hiding. When questioned by police or other authority figures, they often smile inappropriately, fail to remain still when ordered to do so, or act agitated and furtive when they should be calm and polite.
• People with cognitive disabilities may say what they think the police want to hear, even to the point of confessing to crimes they didn’t commit.  Id.
• As reported by the Journal of Psychology and Law, they may waive Miranda rights without realizing the repercussions of doing so, while saying they do understand.

As one police officer put it, “They are the last to leave the scene, the first to get arrested, and the first to confess.”

"It is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants of the laws."  Aristotle, Politics 3.16

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 51 (1788).

In his passage on angels and men Madison provides a justification for government itself and, at the same time, offers the reason for constitutional constraints on political authority: government is necessary, but in the words of Aristotle, but must be retrained by the law which governs all.  Even the government.  In the words of Thomas Paine:

[L]et a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth ... [so] the world may know, that so far we approve of monarchy, that in America the law is king.  For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other.  Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Nelson F. Adkins, ed, Common Sense and Other Political Writings 3, 32 (Liberal Arts, 1953).  Emphasis added.
 
The rules of law which restrain the government are set forth in the U.S. Constitution.  In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, “If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.”  United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment).  This allows “[e]very act of government may be challenged by an appeal to law.”  Id. at 308.
 
So does the rule of law allow one person have a legal right to disregard the law because the law is not convenient? Does he have a legal right to disregard human rights?  What happens if that person is the president?  This is precisely the issue in State of Washington and State of Minnesota v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) where the lawfulness and constitutionality of Executive Order 13769 was challenged.  Judge James L. Robart found that the ‘Muslim ban’ violated four amendments to the US constitution: the First, Fifth, Tenth, and the Fourteenth. Namely, amongst other things, Judge Robart found that Executive Order 13769 violated the requirement of equal protection under the law, finding that the Trump administration showed ‘discriminatory treatment based on their country of origin and/or religion, without lawful justification’. Judge Robart additionally reaffirmed the Tenth Amendment, showing that the Federal Government only has the legal rights delegated to it by the Constitution, and since this Executive Order 13769 was in violation of the constitution, it simply could not be legitimate.
 
During his campaign, President Trump made it clear he was not happy with cities that held themselves out as sanctuaries, suggesting, among other things, that they facilitate crime.  Just five days after taking office, Trump issued an Executive Order—entitled “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States”—that directed relevant cabinet officers to deprive “sanctuary jurisdictions” of federal funding and to “take [additional] appropriate enforcement action” against them.  In City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) the court was confronted with the issue of whether “in the absence of congressional authorization, the Executive Branch may withhold all federal grants from so-called "sanctuary" cities and counties.”  Id. at 1231.  The Court found that “under the principle of separation of powers and in consideration of the spending clause, which vests exclusive power to Congress to impose conditions on federal grants, the Executive Branch may not refuse to disperse the federal grants in question without congressional authorization.”  Id.
 
Clearly, America is at its best when it submits to the rule of law not the rule by, in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a specific tyrant.  As Justice Sonia Sotomayor stated when she was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court, “the rule of law [is] the foundation for all of our basic rights.”

It happens multiple times in Wisconsin courts on any one day: a criminal defendant is found guilty of dealing in controlled substances and after selling four grams of heroin to undercover police officers.  The defendant may be sentenced to probation with conditional jail time.  But not satisfied with that punishment, in one forum or another, the State of Wisconsin will seek to seize the defendant’s vehicle which he had used to purchase, transport and sell the drugs.

Under Wisconsin law, any property used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, or directly or indirectly derived from or realized through the commission of any crime can be forfeited.  Wis. Stat. Sec. 973.075.  It does not matter if it is a vehicle or scuba gear, Wisconsin can try to seize the property.  Id.  Even if the criminal defendant dies and there is no state or federal conviction, Wisconsin can seize the property and accept proceeds from the sale of the property.  Id.  Not only is this true, but the State of Wisconsin conveniently shifts the burden to the individual to show why the property should not be seized.  Wis. Stat. Sec. 973.077.  This shift in the burden exists despite Wisconsin forfeitures supposedly being done “with due provision for the rights of innocent persons.”  Wis. Stat. Sec. 973.075 (5).

The randomness of the risks to the innocent owner that are posed by forfeiture laws have been identified by Justice Thomas and Ginsburg:

The limits on what property can be forfeited as a result of what wrongdoing -- for example, what it means to “use” property in crime for purposes of forfeiture law – are not clear to me…Those limits, whatever they may be, become especially significant when they are the sole restrictions on the state’s ability to take property from those it merely suspects, or does not even suspect, of colluding in crime.
. . . . .
Improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who associate with criminals, than a component of a system of justice. When the property sought to be forfeited has been entrusted by its owner to one who uses it for crime, however, the Constitution apparently assigns to the States and to the political branches of the Federal Government the primary responsibility for avoiding that result.  Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 455-57  (1996) (Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, concurring).

As U.S. Senator Kamala Harris of California, a 2020 Democratic presidential candidate, wrote on Twitter, “Like our broken cash bail system, excessive fines and confiscation of property lead to the criminalization of poverty.”  It should be recalled that the Supreme Court had previously held that forfeitures constitute fines for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (civil forfeitures); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (criminal forfeitures).  It is true that the poorest citizens carry the burden from fines which include “poverty penalties,” i.e., the cost of the original fine plus late fees, interest and administrative fees and even fees for a payment plan.  Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 2, 2-8 (2018). 

Clearly, the US system of fines and fees has created a  two-tiered legal system that separates those who have the ability to pay from those who don’t with judges and court clerks using fines and fees to punish poor people in unequal and enduring ways. Even small amounts of legal debt can be insurmountable obstacles for people living on the margins.  Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as Punishment for the Poor 152 (New York:  Russell  Sage  Foundation,  2016).  As explained in Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law Sch., Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform 15 (2016):

By disproportionately burdening poor people with financial sanctions, and by jailing people who lack the means to pay, many jurisdictions have created a two-tiered system of criminal justice. Unchecked, these policies drive mass incarceration. Excessive fees and fines needlessly enmesh poor people in the criminal justice system by spawning arrests, court proceedings, periods of incarceration, and other modes of supervision for those who lack the ability to pay. Criminal justice debt also contributes to mass incarceration by destabilizing people living at the economic margins and by impeding reentry of formerly incarcerated people who face impossible economic burdens, leading to cycles of poverty and imprisonment.  Id at 1.

It is simply amazing that local governments and municipalities have learned nothing from what happened in Ferguson where the system was run:

on the backs of their poorest and most politically vulnerable citizens. The municipalities appeared to be targeting low-income and black communities with these practices. For example, fines were collected at rates more than fif-teen times higher in one low-income, majority-black community than in a more affluent neighboring municipality. Ferguson was among the three worst offenders.  Beth A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representation as a Tool of Systemic Reform, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1171, 1174-75 (2017) (footnotes omitted).  See also, Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Not Just a Ferguson Problem: How Traffic Courts Drive Inequality in California, 9 (2016)

There now exists empirical date that shows how low-income defendants are affected by monetary sanctions, which include fees for public defenders and a variety of processing charges. Until these debts are paid in full, individuals remain under judicial supervision, subject to court summons, warrants, and jail stays. As a result of interest and surcharges that accumulate on unpaid financial penalties, these monetary sanctions often become insurmountable legal debts which many offenders carry for the remainder of their lives. Such fiscal sentences, which are imposed disproportionately on low-income minorities, help create a permanent economic underclass and deepen social stratification.  Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh:  Monetary Sanctions as a Punishment for the Poor. (New York: Russell Sage, American Sociological Association’s Rose Monograph Series 2016).  And lets not forget that poor citizens are less likely to vote, and to have access to other forms of political power, so governments may find it easier to target fines against them.  It has also been established that police departments often use civil asset forfeiture and other methods to supplement allocated funding.  Worrall and Kovandzic, "Is policing for profit?  Answers from asset forfeiture," 7 Uni. Texas, Dallas, 2 (2008)

The counter-productive nature of imposing excessive fines interferes with society’s need to have a convicted person successfully  re-enter society:

The court’s long-term involvement in [debtor’s] lives [during collections] inhibits reentry: legal or background checks will show an active rec-ord in superior court for individuals who have not fully paid their [criminal debt]. . . . This active record can have serious negative conse-quences on employment, on housing, and on finances. [Criminal] debt also impacts credit rat-ings, making it more difficult to find secure housing.  State v. Blazina, 344 P.3d 680, 684 (Wash. 2015) (citation omitted).  

There may be some hope against the insanity of this system.  In Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ____ (2019) the US Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on excessive fines applies to the states.  The decision revolved around an Indiana man whose luxury SUV was seized after he pleaded guilty to selling heroin.  .” Justice Neil Gorsuch explained in a  separate opinion, which joined the majority’s opinion, that “regardless of the precise vehicle, there can be no serious doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to respect the freedom from excessive fines enshrined in the Eighth Amendment.”  This decision may stand as precedent against policing for profit. 

The arrogance of the government is exemplified in the oral argument for Timbs when Indiana Solicitor General Thomas Fisher found himself arguing that the Constitution would let him forfeit luxury cars caught going five miles over the speed limit.  Incredulous of Fisher’s position, Justice Stephen Breyer asked him, “So what is to happen if a state needing revenue says anyone who speeds has to forfeit the Bugatti, Mercedes, or a special Ferrari or even jalopy?”  Fisher responded that “there is no excessive fines issue” for in rem civil forfeitures, and were completely outside the protection of this constitutional safeguard. So a speeding Bugatti would be “forfeitable,” adding that in rem forfeitures “have always been harsh.”  Justice Sonia Sotomayor quickly rebuked Fisher, and reminded him that “up to a certain point in our history, we didn’t apply the Bill of Rights to the states,” which “did things that under incorporation were unconstitutional.”