Recently, President Trump threatened to take away Rosie O’Donnell’s citizenship. Can Trump do that? Short answer is no. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) the Supreme Court explained it was presented with the issue of whether losing one’s citizenship comports with the Constitution. Id. at 87. Albert Trop was a native-born citizen of the United States who did not voluntarily relinquish or abandon his citizenship or become involved in any way with a foreign nation. He had deserted from the Army and received a dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. He had been gone less than a day, and had willingly surrendered to an officer on an Army vehicle while he was walking back towards his base. Under the law at that time, desertion was punished by loss of citizenship. Chief Justice Earl Warren began his analysis by citing to Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) for principles of citizenship. Justice Warren explained “that citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National Government, and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers. The right may be voluntarily relinquished or abandoned either by express language or by language and conduct that show a renunciation of citizenship.” Id. at 92 Further, “ [d]esertion in wartime, though it may merit the ultimate penalty, does not necessarily signify allegiance to a foreign state…. There was no dilution of his allegiance to this country. The fact that the desertion occurred on foreign soil is of no consequence.” Id. Importantly the Court held: Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior...[C]itizenship is not lost every time a duty of citizenship is shirked. And the deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be. As long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship, and this petitioner has done neither, I believe his fundamental right of citizenship is secure. Id. 92-93 Finally, the Court found that the government’s taking away citizenship violates the Eighth Amendment which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Denationalization is the "total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights and, presumably, as long as he remained in this country, he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so, because he is stateless." Id. at 101. Finally, “[t]his punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community of democracies.” Id. at 102 

A quote which has been attributed to Thomas Jefferson (and Frederick Douglass, James Buchanan, William Henry Harrison, and Ida B. Wells) but is actually a quote from John Philpot Curran, is that “the price of Liberty is eternal vigilance.” Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia, https://www.monticello.org/research-education/thomas-jefferson-encyclopedia/eternal-vigilance-price-liberty-spurious-quotation/ The quote symbolizes the sanctity Americans have placed on the right to be free from government intrusions. A major cause for the American Revolution was the unfettered discretion officials were given to execute general warrants to search and seize colonists’ property at will whenever they wished to do so. These general warrants and “writs of assistance” gave officials unchecked power, since they specified neither the places to be searched nor what items to be seized. Americans were outraged. John Adams and the other revolutionaries understood that if government officials could search and seize us and our property at will, no one could feel or be safe. That’s why the Declaration of Independence says that the purpose of government is “to secure [our] rights,” and why it complained that King George III had “sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance” using general warrants. But once the war was over, Adams and others recognized that their own governments could threaten their security just as King George’s men did. So Adams drafted Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which not only banned general warrants, but recognized that “[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his possessions.” Numerous other states drafted similar constitutional provisions protecting their citizens “from all unreasonable searches and seizures of [their] person, [their] papers, or [their] property.” See generally, Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999). But many feared that federal officials would run roughshod over these rights, so they called for guarantees in the U.S. Constitution against “hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution, for searching and seizing men’s papers, property, and persons.” The Fourth Amendment, based largely on Adams’s work in Massachusetts, is the response to those calls. It shines light on key aspects of the right to be secure. The phrase “persons, houses, papers, and effects” shows the Amendment’s focus on property rights. By drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers sought to guarantee to future generations the same property-rights protections they had acquired over centuries under the common law of both England and America. And one critical property right the Framers sought to protect was the right to exclude other people from your property. James Otis argued against the Writs of Assistance in colonial America which allowed British officials to search homes without warrants. Otis argued that these writs violated the fundamental principle that a man's home is his castle, meaning that individuals have the right to privacy and freedom from arbitrary searches and seizures. He believed that a man's home should be as secure as a prince's castle, free from intrusion even for debt collection or other civil matters. Otis's arguments against the Writs of Assistance helped to solidify the idea that individual rights, including the right to privacy, were fundamental and should be protected from government intrusion. Thomas Y. Davies, id. That’s why the Framers used the term “secure,” which contemporary dictionaries defined as “protected from . . . danger” and “free from fear.” After all, property isn’t truly yours if you fear that government officials may break down the door at any moment. That’s why Adams himself said that “[p]roperty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.” John Adams, "Discourses on Davila" https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-20-02-0195-0002 . See also, William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69), Book II, chapter 1 (There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.) As Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story wrote in one of the first major texts about the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth Amendment “seems indispensable to the full enjoyment of the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. It is little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law.” Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. Vol. 3. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, 1833, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://lonang.com/wp-content/download/Story-CommentariesUSConstitution.pdf Story's observation is supported by the English decisions in Semayne's Case (1604), which contains the famous declaration that “the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress” as reported by Sir Edward Coke. The Fourth Amendment is a broad declaration of our right to be secure in our persons and property but it, like all our rights, is only good so long as courts interpret and apply the right consistent with the Framers’ understanding. Early on, that’s what happened. In the first major Fourth Amendment case that came before the Supreme Court, the Court rejected the government’s claim that it could open letters and packages travelling through the mail, holding that the “constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L. Ed. 877 (1877). In another early case, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s attempt to subpoena a person’s private papers for use in a forfeiture proceeding and declared that [C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis [“resist beginnings”]. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). Modern courts have forgotten, or chose not to recall, this history of the Fourth Amendment. Instead of questioning the actions of the police, many courts give unbridled discretion to the police, Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise Harv. L .Rev. (2017) https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-130/the-judicial-presumption-of-police-expertise/ Ms. Lvovsky argues “that courts in the mid-twentieth century invoked police expertise to expand police authority in multiple areas of the law. They certified policemen as expert witnesses on criminal habits; they deferred to police insights in evaluating arrests and authorizing investigatory stops; and they even credited police knowledge in upholding criminal laws challenged for vagueness, offering the officer’s trained judgment as a check against the risk of arbitrary enforcement.” ___ draws on judicial opinions, appellate records, trial transcripts, police periodicals, and other archival materials, to track the presumption of police expertise from its origins outside the courtroom to its long march through the justice system, shifting from one doctrinal flashpoint to the next. CONTACT ATTORNEY PAUL KSICINSKI  414-261-6222  TO PROTECT ALL YOUR RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL CASES

The Fourth Amendment reads: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The basic purpose behind the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the people’s privacy and protect people against arbitrary invasions by officials of the government. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). See also, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973). It was the Fourth Amendment which was meant to allow, to paraphrase William Pitt, the poorest person to defy all the power of the State. Lasson, N., The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1970) p.49 The language of the Fourth Amendment which refers to the “rights of the people” is critical. The plain reading of the Fourth Amendment applies to “the people.” The Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). The Fourth Amendment by its very language is not limited to "citizens," "freemen," "residents," or "the American people.” The conventions called to ratify the Constitution in New York and Virginia, for example, each recommended an amendment stating, "That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." W. Cuddihy, Search and- Seizure in Great Britain and the American Colonies, (1974), pt. 2, p. 571, n. 129, 574, n. 134. But the Drafters of the Fourth Amendment rejected this limitation and instead provided broadly for "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." Second, historical materials contain no evidence that the Drafters intended to limit the availability of the right expressed in the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment was introduced on the floor of Congress, considered by Committee, debated by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and submitted to the 13 States for approval. Throughout that entire process, no speaker or commentator, pro or con, referred to the term "the people" as a limitation. James Madison, universally recognized as the primary architect of the Bill of Rights, spoke out against the Alien and Sedition Acts less than a decade after the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and explained the intent of the Fourth Amendment: [I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens are no more parties to the laws than they are parties to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection and advantage. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 4 Elliot's Debates 556 (2d ed. 1836). Therefore, "all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection" of the Constitution. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896) IF YOU ARE CHARGED WITH A CRIME, CONTACT ATTORNEY PAUL KSICINSKI AT  414-261-6222  WHO HAS THE EXPERIENCE TO FIGHT FOR YOUR RIGHTS

The main way for ICE to initiate a transfer from the criminal legal system to the immigration system is to send an ICE detainer request (“ICE detainer”) to a state or local jail. See Dangerous Merger: Corrupting the criminal justice system for immigration enforcement, Immigrant Justice Network, available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/IJN-Dangerous-Merger-Primer.pdf. This ICE detainer provides a notice of ICE’s intent to arrest an individual who is currently detained by local officers. The detainer request is written on the Form I-247A and asks the state or local jail to: 1) notify ICE of the person’s release date, as far in advance as possible, and/or 2) maintain custody of the person ICE is trying to arrest for up to 48 hours after the person is eligible for release under state or local law, to give ICE time to arrive and take custody. ICE has changed the form number of their ICE detainers over the years. Form I-247A – Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action was introduced by the Trump administration in 2017. Over the years, various courts throughout the country have agreed that prolonging custody of a person solely based on an ICE detainer request is unlawful for numerous reasons. For instance: Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19 (District of Rhode Island, 2014), affirmed on appeal, --- F.3d ----, 2015 WL 4385945 (1st Circuit, July 17, 2015) HOLDING SOMEONE ON A DETAINER IS A NEW ARREST REQUIRING PROBABLE CAUSE District court: The district court held that the plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, stated a viable Fourth Amendment claim against both ICE and Rhode Island officials where she was held for 24 hours on an ICE detainer. First Circuit Court of Appeals: The ICE defendants appealed, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clear whether the Fourth Amendment applied. The First Circuit rejected the ICE defendants’ argument, affirmed the district court, and held that it was clearly established in 2009 that ICE detainers cause seizures that must comply with the Fourth Amendment. The case is now proceeding to summary judgment. Gonzalez v. ICE is a class action lawsuit against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for placing immigration detainers (or “ICE holds”) on people in jail and extending the length of their detention in jail in violation of the Fourth Amendment. https://www.aclusocal.org/en/cases/gonzalez-v-ice Galarza v. Szalczyk, 2012 WL 1080020 (Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2012), reversed in part on appeal, 745 F.3d 634 (3rd Circuit, 2014)k The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that states and localities are not required to imprison people based on "detainer" requests from the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, ICE, recognizing that states and localities may share liability when they participate in wrongful immigration detentions holding that ICE detainers are merely non-binding requests, not orders, and that Lehigh County could be held liable for its policy of detaining people on that basis. After the Third Circuit’s decision, Lehigh County settled the case for $95,000 in damages and attorneys’ fees, and agreed to adopt a policy of no longer honoring ICE detainers without a court order. https://www.aclupa.org/press-releases/third-circuit-appeals-court-rules-immigration-detainers-are-non-binding-requests/ Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014 WL 1414305 (District of Oregon, 2014); https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/118126/documents/HHRG-119-JU01-20250409-SD006-U6.Pdf The district court held that the plaintiff, who was held on an ICE detainer after she would otherwise have been released on bond, was entitled to summary judgment against Clackamas County for a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The court explained that summary judgment was appropriate because “[t]here is no genuine dispute of material fact that the County maintains a custom or practice in violation of the Fourth Amendment to detain individuals over whom the County no longer has legal authority based only on an ICE detainer which provides no probable cause for detention.” Rather than proceeding to trial on the amount of damages owed, the County settled with the plaintiff for $30,100. DETAINERS EXCEED ICE’S OWN STATUTORY AUTHORITY Jimenez-Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016) ICE placed detainers on individuals without probable cause or adequate investigation. Plaintiffs brought a class action and claimed that ICE detainers exceeded ICE’s own statutory authority and violate the Fourth Amendment. The Northern District of Illinois held that nearly all ICE detainers issued by the Chicago Field Office were invalid. • The court found that ICE has limited authority to arrest without a warrant, and that detainers on individuals in local custody generally exceed this authority. ICE needs to get a warrant to seek the arrest of an individual already in local custody, or else make an individualized finding of risk of escape prior to issuing the detainer. Orellana v. Nobles County, No. 0:15-cv-03852 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2017) An immigrant was prevented from posting bail because of an ICE detainer and sued for unlawful detention. The District of Minnesota held that ICE detainers issued without a finding of likelihood of escape before a warrant can be obtained violate the Fourth Amendment because they exceed ICE Must Have Probable Cause to Issue Detainers  The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires that arrests, such as prolonged detentions on ICE detainers, be based on probable cause. Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 223 (1st Cir. 2015) (an ICE agent must have probable cause to issue an immigration detainer). For instance, a state court ordered a woman released from a local jail on personal recognizance, the jail continued to hold her on an ICE detainer. The ICE detainer claimed that “an investigation ha[d] been initiated” into her, but did not provide further reasons to detain her. Id., at 221 She sued ICE and the jail for unlawful detention, and the court found that ICE is required to have probable cause before seeking to arrest and detain persons. Id. at 215-16. (finding that it is clearly established law that an ICE agent must have probable cause to issue an immigration detainer). The court found that ICE did not have probable cause because it failed to sufficiently investigate her immigration status before issuing the ICE detainer. Morales v. Chadbourne, 235 F. Supp. 3d 388, 397-398 (D.R.I. 2017) (emphasizing its prior finding that foreign birth combined with a lack of information in immigration databases is insufficient for probable cause). In fact, she was a naturalized U.S. citizen ICE has tried issuing detainers based only on information from database searches. That practice has been found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Gonzalez v. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (finding that ICE detainers issued based only on federal database checks – the third box on the I-247A form – violate the Fourth Amendment because they lack sufficient probable cause for arrest). Importantly, the court found that the detainer itself does not provide legal authority for arrest, and thus ICE is causing unlawful arrests to occur unless state law specifically authorizes such seizures. Id. At 1015 . (“ICE violates the Fourth Amendment by issuing detainers to state and local law enforcement agencies in states that do not expressly authorize civil immigration arrests on detainers in state statute”). THUS LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN IGNORE ICE DETAINERS. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 642, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that federal law and regulations do not compel local officers to comply with ICE detainers). However, since that decision, a few states have enacted state laws that require local officers to hold people ICE detainers. See, e.g. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.251; Iowa Code § 27A; Fla. Stat. § 908. See also City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 173 (5th Cir. 2018) (concluding that Texas’ S.B. 4 provision requiring local officers to comply with detainer requests is not facially unconstitutional). Current Wisconsin law does not address ICE, according to the nonpartisan Legislative Reference Bureau. How much are Wisconsin sheriffs willing to play ball? The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and USA TODAY Network-Wisconsin surveyed all 72 sheriffs in Wisconsin about their views and policies on immigration enforcement. Of the 56 sheriffs who responded in some form, many say they do not have the resources or capacity to assist in the new administration’s efforts. Seven Wisconsin sheriff's offices have contracts with ICE through the 287(g) program. They all deal with collaborating with the agency when immigrant inmates are in county jails. See, Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g Six counties' sheriff's offices — Brown, Fond du Lac, Manitowoc, Marquette, Sheboygan and Waushara — operate under the Warrant Service Officer model. That means officers can issue immigration arrest warrants to people in their jails that ICE identifies, and hold them in custody for two days past their release date to give ICE time to pick them up. They do not interview inmates about their immigration status. A bill (AB 24/SB 57) requiring sheriffs to cooperate with ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) has passed the Assembly and is expected to be considered by the Senate. The bill would mandate that sheriffs comply with federal immigration authorities, including requests to hold individuals for 48 hours beyond their scheduled release if ICE requests it. Gov. Tony Evers has indicated he will likely veto the bill if it reaches his desk. https://www.wpr.org/news/wisconsin-senate-testimony-cut-funding-sheriffs-ice Under the Republican-backed proposal, sheriffs would have to request proof of legal status from those who are being held in jail on felony charges. https://spectrumnews1.com/wi/milwaukee/news/2025/05/13/requiring-sheriffs-to-cooperate-with-ice SOURCE: ACLU recent ICE decisions, https://www.aclu.org/documents/recent-ice-detainer-cases Immigrant Legal Resource Center 2017, https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Immigration-DetaiImmigrant ners-Legal-Update-February-2017.pdf ICE detainer advisory, Immigrant Legal Resource Center,

All persons in the United States have constitutional protections, including the right to remain silent when questioned or arrested by immigration officers. Being stopped by immigration officers or other law enforcement can be frightening, but it’s important to stay calm. During any encounter with law enforcement, Stay calm and don’t run, argue, resist, or fight the officer, even if you believe your rights are being violated or you are being treated unfairly. Keep your hands where police can see them, and tell them if you need to reach into a glove compartment or for a wallet to show your papers. If you are a U.S. citizen or have lawful immigration status: Show your passport, legal permanent resident card, work permit, or other documentation of your status. If you are over the age of 18, you should carry your papers with you at all times. If you are undocumented: You have the right to remain silent and do not have to discuss your immigration or citizenship status with the police, immigration agents, or other officials. Anything you tell an officer can later be used against you in immigration court. Tell your loved ones that if you are detained by ICE, they can try to use ICE’s online detainee locator to find you: https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search STOPPING A PERSON Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) / INA § 287(a)(2), Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Officers may conduct warrantless arrests if there is “reason to believe that the alien [] [to be] arrested is [present] in the United States in violation of any [U.S. immigration] law and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for [the] arrest.” Don’t lie about your status or provide false documents. The “reason to believe” standard requires ICE Officers to have probable cause that an individual is in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws and probable cause that the individual is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for the arrest. Timing and Scope of Probable Cause Requirements When Making Warrantless Arrests The ICE officer must conduct this determination at the time of the warrantless arrest. The analysis is required for all warrantless arrests, whether the individual is the target of the enforcement operation or a person arrested as a “collateral arrest” for the intended target. ICE officers must comply with these requirements even if they subsequently issue an administrative warrant during booking and processing. In considering “likelihood of escape,” an ICE Officer must consider the totality of circumstances known to the officer before making the arrest. While there is no exhaustive list of factors that should be considered in determining whether an individual is “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained” under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) / INA § 287(a), factors relevant to the determination may include the ICE Officer’s ability to determine the individual’s identity, knowledge of that individual’s prior escapes or evasions of immigration authorities, attempted flight from an ICE Officer, ties to the community (such as a family, home, or employment) or lack thereof, or other specific circumstances that weigh in favor or against a reasonable belief that the subject is likely to abscond. The Required “Likely to Escape” Probable Cause Analysis Mere presence within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law is not sufficient to conclude that a noncitizen is likely to escape before a warrant for arrestcan be obtained. Whether an individual has a known residence, immediate family members with whom they live or care for, or employment in the community are all relevant factors for whether there is probable cause that the person might escape before an arrest warrant could be obtained The particular circumstances before the ICE Officer are not to be viewed singly; rather, they must be considered as a whole. However, mere presence within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law is not, by itself, sufficient to conclude that an alien is likely to escape before a warrant for arrest can be obtained. When conducting enforcement actions, ICE Officers shall, at the time of arrest or as soon as it is practical and safe to do so, identify themselves as immigration officers in accordance with8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(iii). The Required “Likely to Escape” Probable Cause Analysis Under the Policy, if the ICE officer determines that the noncitizen IS NOT likely to escape before (s)he may obtain a warrant, the ICE officer cannot make the warrantless arrest. In those circumstances, ICE must first obtain a warrant before the individual can be arrested. If the ICE officer determines that the noncitizen IS likely to escape before (s)he may obtain a warrant, under the Policy, the ICE officer must state that the person is under arrest by ICE, the reason for arrest, and then document the basis for that decision in the Form I-213. I-213 Documentation: 6 Required Facts the noncitizen was arrested without a warrant the location of the arrest (e.g., place of business, residence, vehicle, or a public area) whether the noncitizen is an employee of the business, if arrested at a place of business, or whether the noncitizen is a resident of the residence, if arrested at a residential location the noncitizen’s ties to the community, if known at the time of arrest, including family, home, or employment the specific, particularized facts supporting the conclusion that the noncitizen was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained a statement of how “at the time of arrest, the immigration officer [did], as soon as it [was] practical and safe to do so, identif[ied] himself or herself as an immigration officer who is authorized to execute an arrest; and state[d] that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest. After having made an arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) / INA § 287(a)(2), an ICE Officer must document the facts and circumstances surrounding that warrantless arrest in the narrative section of the alien’s I-213 as soon as practicable. This documentation must include: (1) that the alien was arrested without a warrant; (2) the location of the arrest and whether this location was a place of business, residence, vehicle, or a public area; (3) whether the alien is an employee of the business, if arrested at a place of business, or whether the alien is a resident of the residence, if arrested at a residential location; (4) the alien’s ties to the community, if known at the time of arrest, including family, home, or employment (Note: Information learned post-arrest relevant to custody determination should be documented separately from the information relevant to likelihood of escape known at the time of the warrantless arrest.); (5) the specific, particularized facts supporting the conclusion that the alien was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained; and (6) a statement of how “at the time of arrest, the designated immigration officer [did], as soon as it [wa]s practical and safe to do so, identify himself or herself as an immigration officer who is authorized to execute an arrest; and state[d] that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest.” If an officer knocks on your door: Do not open the door. Teach your children not to open the door. Officers must have a warrant signed by a judge to enter your home. ICE “warrants” are not signed by judges; they are ICE forms signed by ICE officers and they do not grant authority to enter a home without consent of the occupant(s). VEHICLE STOPS The policy above applies to all warrantless arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (2) / INA § 287(a)(2), including warrantless arrests resulting from vehicle stops. As federal law enforcement officers, ICE Officers lack federal statutory authority to enforce state or local vehicle or traffic laws. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357 (a)(4), (a)(5) / INA §§ 287(a)(4), (a)(5). Accordingly, when making vehicle stops, ICE Officers shall not state to the driver or occupant(s) of a vehicle that the purpose for a stop is related to any vehicle or traffic laws and regulations. If you are pulled over in a traffic stop: Ask if the officer is from the police department or immigration. Immigration officers often identify themselves as “police,” but they are not police. Ask if they are from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “Likely to Escape” Analysis for Vehicle Stops The required “likely to escape” determination under the Policy applies to all warrantless arrests, including those resulting from vehicle stops. The Policy advises ICE officers that they lack authority to enforce state or local vehicle and traffic laws. Under the Policy, ICE officers are prohibited from stating to a driver or occupant that a vehicle stop is related to a vehicle or traffic violation. All vehicle stops to enforce civil immigration laws require specific, articulable facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains a noncitizen who may be illegally in the United States. Factors that may warrant reasonable suspicion to make a vehicle stop near or at the border may not be the same that would warrant reasonable suspicion in the interior of the United States. Factors that may satisfy reasonable suspicion in the interior should be more specific to a suspected individual rather than factors related to a vehicle, the appearance of its occupants, or location of the encounter. Under the Policy, in addition to the documentation requirements for warrantless arrests, ICE officers must document the facts and circumstances surrounding a vehicle stop that resulted in a warrantless arrest in the narrative section of the Form I213. Specifically, the ICE officer must document: specific, articulable facts prior to the stop that formed the basis for the ICE officer’s reasonable suspicion that a noncitizen in the vehicle stopped was present within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law  ICE Officers may stop a vehicle to enforce civil immigration laws only if they are aware of specific, articulable facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains an alien(s) who may be illegally in the country. As soon as practicable after making an arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) / INA § 287(a)(2) pursuant to a vehicle stop, in addition to the documentation requirements for warrantless arrests described above, the ICE Officer also must document the facts and circumstances surrounding the vehicle stop that resulted in a warrantless arrest in the narrative section of the alien’s I-213. This documentation shall include the specific, articulable facts that formed the basis for the ICE Officer’s reasonable suspicion that an alien in the vehicle stopped was present within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law. SOURCE: NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER

LITTLE V. LLANO COUNTY: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS LIBRARIES TO REMOVE BOOKS BASED ON VIEWPOINT OR CONTENT

Former FBI chief James Comey is facing an investigation after he shared an image on social media, of seashells on a beach arranged to resemble the numbers 8647. Comey, who was fired by Trump in 2017, is facing backlash from MAGA over the post with key figures in Trump’s team making serious allegations against him. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, whose agency oversees the Secret Service, said on X that DHS and the Secret Service were "investigating this threat and will respond appropriately." Would the prosecution of Comey pass constitutional review? No. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures — and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674 (1944). The “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). See Seth D. Berlin, Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, Are The Nuremberg Files and “Wanted” Posters Protected Advocacy or Unprotected Threat? 20-Sum Comm. Law. 1, 28 (2002) (“In Brandenburg v. Ohio , the U.S. Supreme Court held that speech advocating violence—there, a Ku Klux Klan member's statement ‘there might have to be some revengence taken’—was constitutionally protected unless it was directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless action.”) In Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444(1969), the Court solidified what had been developing in a line of cases throughout much of the century, and concluded that the government cannot forbid a threat "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to in cite or produce such action." at 447. The holding in Brandenburg was not limited to political speech or political speech of marginalized speakers as indicated by lower court decisions. 1 According to the dictionary site Merriam-Webster, https://www.the-independent.com/news/james-comey-donald-trump-republicans-new-york-instagram-b2752909.html , “86” means to "to throw out,” or “get rid of,” and derives from a 1930s slang restaurant worker term for “sold out.” The number 47 is believed to refer to President Trump, as the 47th president. 2 see Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) not limited to political speech or political speech of marginalized speakers as indicated by lower court decisions. See e.g. Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc. , 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1280 (D. Colo. 2002); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. , 814 F.2d 1017, 1024(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959(1988). Courts applying the Brandenburg test have referred to it as an “exacting” test that even applies to threats that could be construed to advocate criminal activity. Sanders , id. As the US Supreme Court has said it is "often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." and that free speech involves not only responsible criticism of public officials but the right to speak foolishly and without moderation. Cohen v. California , 403 US 15, 25-26(1971) (the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us); Baumgartner v. United States , 322 US 665, 673-74(1944). Thus foolish, vulgar threats, even threats to kill, are not true threats while serious detailed statements are true threats. See, Watts v. US , 394 US 705 (1969) (speech was constitutionally protected where, during a public rally on the Washington Monument grounds, the defendant said, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.") Watts stands for the principle that expressly threatening speech must be taken in context, and the context must include the speaker's ability to immediately harm the intended target. Watts , 394 U.S. at 705. The standard articulated in Brandenburg , that speech remains protected even if it advocates the use of violence, so long as such advocacy will not result in "imminent lawless action" is consistent with Watts . Further, a threat must be taken in context, and the context must include the speaker's desire and ability to immediately harm the intended target. Id.; Brandenburg , 395 U.S. 446-448. Finally, speech that expressly or impliedly advocates the use of violence remains protected by the First Amendment, unless that speech, taken in context, is likely to incite immediate lawless action. Watts , 394 U.S. at 705. See also, Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1015(9th Cir. 2001), affirmed by, in part, vacated by, in part, remanded by, Planned Parenthood of the Colombia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058(9th Cir. 2002) Watts holds that threats that imply an action at an uncertain and future remote time are not true threats and thus protected by the first amendment. Watts , at 707-08. Thus, punishment for a threat itself is constitutionally permissible only if "the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution." United States v. Baker , 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1995), quoting United States v. Kelner , 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alkhabaz , 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). The statement in the sand on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made was not so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution. Cf. Kelner , 534 F.2d 1028(defendant’s threat had to harm by use of a weapon credible since at the time of speech he was armed with a .38-caliber pistol.) Therefore prosecution for such a statement is constitutionally prohibited.

There are news articles all over about how Trump is attacking law firms and even the American Bar Association. ‘A capitalistic cowardice’: big law firms being threatened by Trump face pressure to speak out, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/26/trump-executive-orders-law-firms ; Justice Department expands its retribution to American Bar Association, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-department-expands-retribution-to-american-bar-association/ Typically the law firms attacked are those who have investigated Trump or represented those who oppose him. Some have dismissed the importance of these attacks, saying they are like attacks against the legal profession in the past. After all, Shakespeare used the line ''The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers,'' was stated by Dick the Butcher in ''Henry VI,'' Part II, act IV, Scene II, Line 73. But in actuality the Shakespeare line is more a tribute to lawyers than the attack by Trump. Dick the Butcher ( a killer as evil as his name implies) was a follower of the rebel Jack Cade, who thought that if he disturbed law and order, he could become king. The setup for the "kill the lawyers" statement is the ending portion of a comedic relief part of a scene in Henry VI, part 2. Dick and another henchman, Smith are members of the gang of Jack Cade, a pretender to the throne. The built-up is long portion where Cade makes vain boasts, which are cut down by sarcastic replies from the others. Cade proceeds to go more and more over the top, and begins to describe his absurd ideal world: JACK CADE. Be brave, then; for your captain is brave, and vows reformation. There shall be in England seven half-penny loaves sold for a penny: the three-hoop'd pot shall have ten hoops; and I will make it felony to drink small beer: all the realm shall be in common; and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass: and when I am king,- as king I will be,- ALL. God save your majesty! Appreciated and encouraged, he continues on in this vein: JACK CADE. I thank you, good people:- there shall be no money; all shall eat and drink on my score; and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers, and worship me their lord. And here is where Dick speaks the famous line. DICK. The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers. It is the paragraph that follows that is most interesting. Cade replies: CADE: Nay, that I mean to do. Is not this a lamentable thing, that of the skin of an innocent lamb should be made parchment? that parchment, being scribbled o’er, should undo a man. Some say the bee stings; but I say, ’tis the bee’s wax; for I did but seal once to a thing, and I was never mine own man since . . . . Emphasis added. In plainer words, it is Cade’s view that the language of lawyers (words written on parchment) enslaves; it is not his view that it liberates. It is lawyers’ language that takes away liberty; it does not protect liberty. It is the lawyers themselves who are instruments of the oppressors, not the defenders of liberty. Dick’s statement comes from a murderer, not a friend of liberty. Shakespeare knew that such anarchy could only succeed if lawyers were eliminated. The interpretation was initially advanced in 1985 by Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors , 473 U.S. 305, 105 S.Ct. 3180 (1985) which denied the right to counsel to veteran’s in administrative hearings. In Walters , Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six-justice majority, articulated remarkably negative (how much of this attitude is shared by the rest of the judiciary is a question for another day) view about the legal profession and the adversary system-so negative, in fact, that Justice Stevens both began and ended his dissent with the extraordinary charge that the Court, "does not appreciate the value of individual liberty." Id. at 358, 372 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Simply stated, the argument that the line is meant to praise lawyers is that the sentence was uttered by a thoroughgoing blackguard, a “riotous anarchist whose intent was to overthrow the lawful government of England.” Shakespeare knew that such anarchy could only succeed if lawyers were eliminated. A very rough and simplistic modern translation of Cade’s words would be "When I'm the King, there'll be two cars in every garage, and a chicken in every pot" "AND NO LAWYERS". It's a clearly) lawyer-bashing joke. The "kill the lawyers" joke is expressed by villains, who later commit murderous deeds. This is their rough solution to a social problem. As stated by the web page Lawyers are Our Friends !: Cade's friend Dick the Butcher, being only barely smarter than Cade, knew Cade's scheme could not succeed if the learned advisors to the real King actually investigated Cade's lineage. So, Dick the Butcher advised Cade that "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers," hoping that this tactic would prevent Cade from being discovered as an imposter. At least in Shakespeare's time, lawyers were regarded as the protectors of truth. Perhaps the line ‘kill all the lawyers” is a warning to all us lawyers to engage in self examination of ourselves and our profession to do what we can to protect liberty and so law is not an instrument of oppression by the powerful against the powerless. What lawyer’s do on an everyday basis was explained by Justice Stevens: “There is no reason to assume that lawyers would add confusion rather than clarity to [ ] proceedings. As a profession lawyers are skilled communicators dedicated to the service of their clients. Only if it is assumed that the average lawyer is incompetent or unscrupulous can one rationally conclude that the efficiency of the agency's work would be undermined.” Walter at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama : "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."' Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S.335, 344-45 (1963).

This is a complex topic and this article only supplies generalized information on obscenity. There are many nuances to this topic so that the question can be asked is obscenity constitutionally protected? Short answer is no. But this is a very narrow category of sexually explicit expression that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled is not protected by the First Amendment. Generally, prurient material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts is not constitutionally protected. Roth v. United States , 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957) The material must exhibit a ''shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion.'' Ginzburg v. United States , 383 U.S. 463, 486 (1966). Materials which appeal only to ''normal, healthy, sexual desires'' are not considered obscene. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. , 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985) There is a regular flow of news articles about whether particular material should be suppressed as obscene. Rightwing groups across US push new bans to limit ‘obscene’ books in libraries, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/01/new-book-bans-library-schools ; Iowa law banning books including 1984 and Ulysses blocked by US federal judge, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2025/mar/26/iowa-law-banning-books-including-1984-and-ulysses-blocked-by-us-federal-judge#:~:text=Iowa%20law%20banning%20books%20including%201984%20and%20Ulysses% . The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that the First Amendment applies only to statements which inform rather than statements which entertain. The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. It is not the role of the government to make value judgements about oral or written statements. “What is one man's amusement teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.” Winters v. New York , 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Illustrative of the general observation is the fact that [m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment. Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). Nude dancing is also. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. , 501 U.S. 560, 564 (1991). This is because “[t]he right to impart and to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society.” Stanley v. Georgia , 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). This is especially true if the material is possessed in the privacy of one’s home. Id. In a free society, it is fundamental that citizens have a right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. Id. "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Olmstead v. United States , 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U. S. 479, 381 U. S. 482 (1965); cf. NAACP v. Alabama , 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 462 (1958). Despite this conservative notion of individual liberty, many assert the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. In reality, this assertion amounts to the belief that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. To some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment. As the Court said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents , 360 U. S. 684, 360 U. S. 688-689 (1959): "[t]his argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. . . . And, in the realm of ideas, it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing." Stanley v. Georgia , at 565-66. Accordingly, obscene material, referring to certain sexually explicit material, see Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. , 594 U.S. 180 (2021) (holding school's interests in preventing disruption not sufficient where student posted profane message off campus about school activity); Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (noting that obscene expression must be erotic, not just crude), may be protected even if it is arguably devoid of any ideological content. Stanley v. Georgia , at 566. But what if the material advocates some immoral position? As explained in Stanley v. Georgia , the advocacy of an unpopular social opinion may sometimes be proper no less than advocacy of some political opinion. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents , at 688-89.