All persons in the United States have constitutional protections, including the right to remain silent when questioned or arrested by immigration officers. Being stopped by immigration officers or other law enforcement can be frightening, but it’s important to stay calm. During any encounter with law enforcement, Stay calm and don’t run, argue, resist, or fight the officer, even if you believe your rights are being violated or you are being treated unfairly. Keep your hands where police can see them, and tell them if you need to reach into a glove compartment or for a wallet to show your papers. If you are a U.S. citizen or have lawful immigration status: Show your passport, legal permanent resident card, work permit, or other documentation of your status. If you are over the age of 18, you should carry your papers with you at all times. If you are undocumented: You have the right to remain silent and do not have to discuss your immigration or citizenship status with the police, immigration agents, or other officials. Anything you tell an officer can later be used against you in immigration court. Tell your loved ones that if you are detained by ICE, they can try to use ICE’s online detainee locator to find you: https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search STOPPING A PERSON Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) / INA § 287(a)(2), Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Officers may conduct warrantless arrests if there is “reason to believe that the alien [] [to be] arrested is [present] in the United States in violation of any [U.S. immigration] law and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for [the] arrest.” Don’t lie about your status or provide false documents. The “reason to believe” standard requires ICE Officers to have probable cause that an individual is in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws and probable cause that the individual is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for the arrest. Timing and Scope of Probable Cause Requirements When Making Warrantless Arrests The ICE officer must conduct this determination at the time of the warrantless arrest. The analysis is required for all warrantless arrests, whether the individual is the target of the enforcement operation or a person arrested as a “collateral arrest” for the intended target. ICE officers must comply with these requirements even if they subsequently issue an administrative warrant during booking and processing. In considering “likelihood of escape,” an ICE Officer must consider the totality of circumstances known to the officer before making the arrest. While there is no exhaustive list of factors that should be considered in determining whether an individual is “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained” under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) / INA § 287(a), factors relevant to the determination may include the ICE Officer’s ability to determine the individual’s identity, knowledge of that individual’s prior escapes or evasions of immigration authorities, attempted flight from an ICE Officer, ties to the community (such as a family, home, or employment) or lack thereof, or other specific circumstances that weigh in favor or against a reasonable belief that the subject is likely to abscond. The Required “Likely to Escape” Probable Cause Analysis Mere presence within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law is not sufficient to conclude that a noncitizen is likely to escape before a warrant for arrestcan be obtained. Whether an individual has a known residence, immediate family members with whom they live or care for, or employment in the community are all relevant factors for whether there is probable cause that the person might escape before an arrest warrant could be obtained The particular circumstances before the ICE Officer are not to be viewed singly; rather, they must be considered as a whole. However, mere presence within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law is not, by itself, sufficient to conclude that an alien is likely to escape before a warrant for arrest can be obtained. When conducting enforcement actions, ICE Officers shall, at the time of arrest or as soon as it is practical and safe to do so, identify themselves as immigration officers in accordance with8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(iii). The Required “Likely to Escape” Probable Cause Analysis Under the Policy, if the ICE officer determines that the noncitizen IS NOT likely to escape before (s)he may obtain a warrant, the ICE officer cannot make the warrantless arrest. In those circumstances, ICE must first obtain a warrant before the individual can be arrested. If the ICE officer determines that the noncitizen IS likely to escape before (s)he may obtain a warrant, under the Policy, the ICE officer must state that the person is under arrest by ICE, the reason for arrest, and then document the basis for that decision in the Form I-213. I-213 Documentation: 6 Required Facts the noncitizen was arrested without a warrant the location of the arrest (e.g., place of business, residence, vehicle, or a public area) whether the noncitizen is an employee of the business, if arrested at a place of business, or whether the noncitizen is a resident of the residence, if arrested at a residential location the noncitizen’s ties to the community, if known at the time of arrest, including family, home, or employment the specific, particularized facts supporting the conclusion that the noncitizen was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained a statement of how “at the time of arrest, the immigration officer [did], as soon as it [was] practical and safe to do so, identif[ied] himself or herself as an immigration officer who is authorized to execute an arrest; and state[d] that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest. After having made an arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) / INA § 287(a)(2), an ICE Officer must document the facts and circumstances surrounding that warrantless arrest in the narrative section of the alien’s I-213 as soon as practicable. This documentation must include: (1) that the alien was arrested without a warrant; (2) the location of the arrest and whether this location was a place of business, residence, vehicle, or a public area; (3) whether the alien is an employee of the business, if arrested at a place of business, or whether the alien is a resident of the residence, if arrested at a residential location; (4) the alien’s ties to the community, if known at the time of arrest, including family, home, or employment (Note: Information learned post-arrest relevant to custody determination should be documented separately from the information relevant to likelihood of escape known at the time of the warrantless arrest.); (5) the specific, particularized facts supporting the conclusion that the alien was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained; and (6) a statement of how “at the time of arrest, the designated immigration officer [did], as soon as it [wa]s practical and safe to do so, identify himself or herself as an immigration officer who is authorized to execute an arrest; and state[d] that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest.” If an officer knocks on your door: Do not open the door. Teach your children not to open the door. Officers must have a warrant signed by a judge to enter your home. ICE “warrants” are not signed by judges; they are ICE forms signed by ICE officers and they do not grant authority to enter a home without consent of the occupant(s). VEHICLE STOPS The policy above applies to all warrantless arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (2) / INA § 287(a)(2), including warrantless arrests resulting from vehicle stops. As federal law enforcement officers, ICE Officers lack federal statutory authority to enforce state or local vehicle or traffic laws. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357 (a)(4), (a)(5) / INA §§ 287(a)(4), (a)(5). Accordingly, when making vehicle stops, ICE Officers shall not state to the driver or occupant(s) of a vehicle that the purpose for a stop is related to any vehicle or traffic laws and regulations. If you are pulled over in a traffic stop: Ask if the officer is from the police department or immigration. Immigration officers often identify themselves as “police,” but they are not police. Ask if they are from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “Likely to Escape” Analysis for Vehicle Stops The required “likely to escape” determination under the Policy applies to all warrantless arrests, including those resulting from vehicle stops. The Policy advises ICE officers that they lack authority to enforce state or local vehicle and traffic laws. Under the Policy, ICE officers are prohibited from stating to a driver or occupant that a vehicle stop is related to a vehicle or traffic violation. All vehicle stops to enforce civil immigration laws require specific, articulable facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains a noncitizen who may be illegally in the United States. Factors that may warrant reasonable suspicion to make a vehicle stop near or at the border may not be the same that would warrant reasonable suspicion in the interior of the United States. Factors that may satisfy reasonable suspicion in the interior should be more specific to a suspected individual rather than factors related to a vehicle, the appearance of its occupants, or location of the encounter. Under the Policy, in addition to the documentation requirements for warrantless arrests, ICE officers must document the facts and circumstances surrounding a vehicle stop that resulted in a warrantless arrest in the narrative section of the Form I213. Specifically, the ICE officer must document: specific, articulable facts prior to the stop that formed the basis for the ICE officer’s reasonable suspicion that a noncitizen in the vehicle stopped was present within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law  ICE Officers may stop a vehicle to enforce civil immigration laws only if they are aware of specific, articulable facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains an alien(s) who may be illegally in the country. As soon as practicable after making an arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) / INA § 287(a)(2) pursuant to a vehicle stop, in addition to the documentation requirements for warrantless arrests described above, the ICE Officer also must document the facts and circumstances surrounding the vehicle stop that resulted in a warrantless arrest in the narrative section of the alien’s I-213. This documentation shall include the specific, articulable facts that formed the basis for the ICE Officer’s reasonable suspicion that an alien in the vehicle stopped was present within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law. SOURCE: NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER

LITTLE V. LLANO COUNTY: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS LIBRARIES TO REMOVE BOOKS BASED ON VIEWPOINT OR CONTENT

Former FBI chief James Comey is facing an investigation after he shared an image on social media, of seashells on a beach arranged to resemble the numbers 8647. Comey, who was fired by Trump in 2017, is facing backlash from MAGA over the post with key figures in Trump’s team making serious allegations against him. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, whose agency oversees the Secret Service, said on X that DHS and the Secret Service were "investigating this threat and will respond appropriately." Would the prosecution of Comey pass constitutional review? No. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures — and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674 (1944). The “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). See Seth D. Berlin, Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, Are The Nuremberg Files and “Wanted” Posters Protected Advocacy or Unprotected Threat? 20-Sum Comm. Law. 1, 28 (2002) (“In Brandenburg v. Ohio , the U.S. Supreme Court held that speech advocating violence—there, a Ku Klux Klan member's statement ‘there might have to be some revengence taken’—was constitutionally protected unless it was directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless action.”) In Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444(1969), the Court solidified what had been developing in a line of cases throughout much of the century, and concluded that the government cannot forbid a threat "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to in cite or produce such action." at 447. The holding in Brandenburg was not limited to political speech or political speech of marginalized speakers as indicated by lower court decisions. 1 According to the dictionary site Merriam-Webster, https://www.the-independent.com/news/james-comey-donald-trump-republicans-new-york-instagram-b2752909.html , “86” means to "to throw out,” or “get rid of,” and derives from a 1930s slang restaurant worker term for “sold out.” The number 47 is believed to refer to President Trump, as the 47th president. 2 see Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) not limited to political speech or political speech of marginalized speakers as indicated by lower court decisions. See e.g. Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc. , 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1280 (D. Colo. 2002); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. , 814 F.2d 1017, 1024(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959(1988). Courts applying the Brandenburg test have referred to it as an “exacting” test that even applies to threats that could be construed to advocate criminal activity. Sanders , id. As the US Supreme Court has said it is "often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." and that free speech involves not only responsible criticism of public officials but the right to speak foolishly and without moderation. Cohen v. California , 403 US 15, 25-26(1971) (the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us); Baumgartner v. United States , 322 US 665, 673-74(1944). Thus foolish, vulgar threats, even threats to kill, are not true threats while serious detailed statements are true threats. See, Watts v. US , 394 US 705 (1969) (speech was constitutionally protected where, during a public rally on the Washington Monument grounds, the defendant said, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.") Watts stands for the principle that expressly threatening speech must be taken in context, and the context must include the speaker's ability to immediately harm the intended target. Watts , 394 U.S. at 705. The standard articulated in Brandenburg , that speech remains protected even if it advocates the use of violence, so long as such advocacy will not result in "imminent lawless action" is consistent with Watts . Further, a threat must be taken in context, and the context must include the speaker's desire and ability to immediately harm the intended target. Id.; Brandenburg , 395 U.S. 446-448. Finally, speech that expressly or impliedly advocates the use of violence remains protected by the First Amendment, unless that speech, taken in context, is likely to incite immediate lawless action. Watts , 394 U.S. at 705. See also, Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1015(9th Cir. 2001), affirmed by, in part, vacated by, in part, remanded by, Planned Parenthood of the Colombia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058(9th Cir. 2002) Watts holds that threats that imply an action at an uncertain and future remote time are not true threats and thus protected by the first amendment. Watts , at 707-08. Thus, punishment for a threat itself is constitutionally permissible only if "the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution." United States v. Baker , 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1995), quoting United States v. Kelner , 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alkhabaz , 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). The statement in the sand on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made was not so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution. Cf. Kelner , 534 F.2d 1028(defendant’s threat had to harm by use of a weapon credible since at the time of speech he was armed with a .38-caliber pistol.) Therefore prosecution for such a statement is constitutionally prohibited.

There are news articles all over about how Trump is attacking law firms and even the American Bar Association. ‘A capitalistic cowardice’: big law firms being threatened by Trump face pressure to speak out, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/26/trump-executive-orders-law-firms ; Justice Department expands its retribution to American Bar Association, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-department-expands-retribution-to-american-bar-association/ Typically the law firms attacked are those who have investigated Trump or represented those who oppose him. Some have dismissed the importance of these attacks, saying they are like attacks against the legal profession in the past. After all, Shakespeare used the line ''The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers,'' was stated by Dick the Butcher in ''Henry VI,'' Part II, act IV, Scene II, Line 73. But in actuality the Shakespeare line is more a tribute to lawyers than the attack by Trump. Dick the Butcher ( a killer as evil as his name implies) was a follower of the rebel Jack Cade, who thought that if he disturbed law and order, he could become king. The setup for the "kill the lawyers" statement is the ending portion of a comedic relief part of a scene in Henry VI, part 2. Dick and another henchman, Smith are members of the gang of Jack Cade, a pretender to the throne. The built-up is long portion where Cade makes vain boasts, which are cut down by sarcastic replies from the others. Cade proceeds to go more and more over the top, and begins to describe his absurd ideal world: JACK CADE. Be brave, then; for your captain is brave, and vows reformation. There shall be in England seven half-penny loaves sold for a penny: the three-hoop'd pot shall have ten hoops; and I will make it felony to drink small beer: all the realm shall be in common; and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass: and when I am king,- as king I will be,- ALL. God save your majesty! Appreciated and encouraged, he continues on in this vein: JACK CADE. I thank you, good people:- there shall be no money; all shall eat and drink on my score; and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers, and worship me their lord. And here is where Dick speaks the famous line. DICK. The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers. It is the paragraph that follows that is most interesting. Cade replies: CADE: Nay, that I mean to do. Is not this a lamentable thing, that of the skin of an innocent lamb should be made parchment? that parchment, being scribbled o’er, should undo a man. Some say the bee stings; but I say, ’tis the bee’s wax; for I did but seal once to a thing, and I was never mine own man since . . . . Emphasis added. In plainer words, it is Cade’s view that the language of lawyers (words written on parchment) enslaves; it is not his view that it liberates. It is lawyers’ language that takes away liberty; it does not protect liberty. It is the lawyers themselves who are instruments of the oppressors, not the defenders of liberty. Dick’s statement comes from a murderer, not a friend of liberty. Shakespeare knew that such anarchy could only succeed if lawyers were eliminated. The interpretation was initially advanced in 1985 by Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors , 473 U.S. 305, 105 S.Ct. 3180 (1985) which denied the right to counsel to veteran’s in administrative hearings. In Walters , Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six-justice majority, articulated remarkably negative (how much of this attitude is shared by the rest of the judiciary is a question for another day) view about the legal profession and the adversary system-so negative, in fact, that Justice Stevens both began and ended his dissent with the extraordinary charge that the Court, "does not appreciate the value of individual liberty." Id. at 358, 372 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Simply stated, the argument that the line is meant to praise lawyers is that the sentence was uttered by a thoroughgoing blackguard, a “riotous anarchist whose intent was to overthrow the lawful government of England.” Shakespeare knew that such anarchy could only succeed if lawyers were eliminated. A very rough and simplistic modern translation of Cade’s words would be "When I'm the King, there'll be two cars in every garage, and a chicken in every pot" "AND NO LAWYERS". It's a clearly) lawyer-bashing joke. The "kill the lawyers" joke is expressed by villains, who later commit murderous deeds. This is their rough solution to a social problem. As stated by the web page Lawyers are Our Friends !: Cade's friend Dick the Butcher, being only barely smarter than Cade, knew Cade's scheme could not succeed if the learned advisors to the real King actually investigated Cade's lineage. So, Dick the Butcher advised Cade that "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers," hoping that this tactic would prevent Cade from being discovered as an imposter. At least in Shakespeare's time, lawyers were regarded as the protectors of truth. Perhaps the line ‘kill all the lawyers” is a warning to all us lawyers to engage in self examination of ourselves and our profession to do what we can to protect liberty and so law is not an instrument of oppression by the powerful against the powerless. What lawyer’s do on an everyday basis was explained by Justice Stevens: “There is no reason to assume that lawyers would add confusion rather than clarity to [ ] proceedings. As a profession lawyers are skilled communicators dedicated to the service of their clients. Only if it is assumed that the average lawyer is incompetent or unscrupulous can one rationally conclude that the efficiency of the agency's work would be undermined.” Walter at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama : "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."' Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S.335, 344-45 (1963).

This is a complex topic and this article only supplies generalized information on obscenity. There are many nuances to this topic so that the question can be asked is obscenity constitutionally protected? Short answer is no. But this is a very narrow category of sexually explicit expression that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled is not protected by the First Amendment. Generally, prurient material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts is not constitutionally protected. Roth v. United States , 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957) The material must exhibit a ''shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion.'' Ginzburg v. United States , 383 U.S. 463, 486 (1966). Materials which appeal only to ''normal, healthy, sexual desires'' are not considered obscene. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. , 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985) There is a regular flow of news articles about whether particular material should be suppressed as obscene. Rightwing groups across US push new bans to limit ‘obscene’ books in libraries, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/01/new-book-bans-library-schools ; Iowa law banning books including 1984 and Ulysses blocked by US federal judge, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2025/mar/26/iowa-law-banning-books-including-1984-and-ulysses-blocked-by-us-federal-judge#:~:text=Iowa%20law%20banning%20books%20including%201984%20and%20Ulysses% . The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that the First Amendment applies only to statements which inform rather than statements which entertain. The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. It is not the role of the government to make value judgements about oral or written statements. “What is one man's amusement teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.” Winters v. New York , 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Illustrative of the general observation is the fact that [m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment. Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). Nude dancing is also. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. , 501 U.S. 560, 564 (1991). This is because “[t]he right to impart and to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society.” Stanley v. Georgia , 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). This is especially true if the material is possessed in the privacy of one’s home. Id. In a free society, it is fundamental that citizens have a right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. Id. "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Olmstead v. United States , 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U. S. 479, 381 U. S. 482 (1965); cf. NAACP v. Alabama , 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 462 (1958). Despite this conservative notion of individual liberty, many assert the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. In reality, this assertion amounts to the belief that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. To some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment. As the Court said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents , 360 U. S. 684, 360 U. S. 688-689 (1959): "[t]his argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. . . . And, in the realm of ideas, it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing." Stanley v. Georgia , at 565-66. Accordingly, obscene material, referring to certain sexually explicit material, see Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. , 594 U.S. 180 (2021) (holding school's interests in preventing disruption not sufficient where student posted profane message off campus about school activity); Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (noting that obscene expression must be erotic, not just crude), may be protected even if it is arguably devoid of any ideological content. Stanley v. Georgia , at 566. But what if the material advocates some immoral position? As explained in Stanley v. Georgia , the advocacy of an unpopular social opinion may sometimes be proper no less than advocacy of some political opinion. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents , at 688-89. 

What does it mean when President Trump states that he wants to do away with birthright citizenship? To answer that, one must understand some legal history. Dred Scott v. Sandford , 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), was a horrible decision of the United States Supreme Court which found that the U.S. Constitution did not extend American citizenship to people of black African descent, and therefore they could not enjoy the rights and privileges the Constitution conferred upon American citizens. In essence, Black people could never be citizens of the United States, even if they were free. Dred Scott , 60 U.S. at 406–27. Dred Scott thus endorsed racialized citizenship in America. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney read the 7-2 opinion which also stated that Congress had no authority to ban slavery from a federal territory. In this ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that enslaved people were not citizens of the United States and, therefore, could not expect any protection from the federal go vernment or the courts. The opinion also stated that Congress had no authority to ban slavery from a Federal territory. In essence – and contrary to tradition – the Supreme Court imposed a test of inherited citizenship in America. Due to the existence of chattel slavery, the Court reasoned, all Black people in the United States of America failed this test since all of them (according to Chief Justice Roger B. Taney) were either enslaved or descended from enslaved people. Dred Scott also moved us a step closer to our Civil War. Justice Taney wrote that “[t]his opinion [as to Black inferiority] . . . was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.” Dred Scott , 60 U.S. at 407. Because members of the “negro African race” were considered “beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race” when the Constitution was drafted, neither slaves nor their descendants, regardless of whether they were free, were “intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.” Id. at 406, 407; see also id. at 404–05. Thus, our Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford set forth a racialized definition of American citizenship that excluded Black people, free or enslaved, just four years before the start of the Civil War. In 1865, after the Union's victory in the Civil War, the Court's ruling in Dred Scott was rejected by the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which abolished slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment, whose first section guaranteed citizenship for "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The Supreme Court unequivocally found that “[t]he main object of the opening sentence of the fourteenth amendment was to settle the question. . . as to the citizenship of free [Black people]. . . and to put it beyond doubt that all persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be citizens of the United States and of the state in which they re- side.” Elk v. Wilkins , 112 U.S. 94, 101 (1884) (citations omitted and emphasis added); United States v. Wong Kim Ark , 169 U.S. 649, 675 (1898) (noting that the “fundamental principle of citizenship by birth within the dominion was reaffirmed in the most explicit and comprehensive terms” in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted over President Johnson’s (a racist former slaveowner) veto, set forth that “all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.” Wong Kim Ark , 169 U.S. at 675 (discussing the Act). See, GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006) (discussing Johnson’s veto and noting that “no Congress had ever before overridden a presidential veto on an important measure”), https://www.amazon.com/Democracy-Reborn-Fourteenth-Amendment-Post-Civil/dp/0805086633 The whites only citizenry principle set forth in Dred Scott was rejected for the inclusive Fourteenth Amendment principle of citizenship at birth for all persons, regardless of race in America. It is important to understand that the Fourteenth Amendment principle of citizenship at birth was not a new idea but one based on three hundred years of British common law. Wong Kim Ark , 169 U.S. at 655–58; Id. at 660 (“Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.”) (citations omitted). This rule was articulated by Sir Edward Coke in Calvin v. Smith , 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (KB) (Calvin’s Case) (1608). Heather Horn, Birthright Citizenship Wasn’t Born in America, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/birthright-citizenship-donald-trump-england/403159/ Therefore, President Trump’s desire to reject birthright citizenship is contrary to constitutional law enacted by virtue of the American Civil War.

Let’s try a little thought experiment. A husband and pregnant TIwife from the Taiwan are flying to the United States. As the jet enters American air space, the mother gives birth to her baby. Does the baby have a right to American citizenship? This is not just a thought experiment. It really did happen. Plane birth sparks controversy in Taiwan, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34568772 . However, the actual event did not happen in American airspace but over international waters. But assume the facts of our thought experiment. The answer to the question does the baby have a right to American citizenship was answered by the Supreme Court over a 100 years ago in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark , 169 U.S. 649 (1898). This judicial decision has been affirmed by the US Department of State. The U.S. Dept. of State Foreign Affairs Manual, 8 FAM 301.1-5 (“The rules applicable to vessels obviously apply equally to airplanes. Thus a child born on a plane in the United States or flying over its territory would acquire United States citizenship at birth.”), https://fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/08fam030101.html In Wong Kim Ark , the U.S. Supreme Court examined at length the theories and legal precedents on which the U.S. citizenship laws are based. In particular, the Court discussed the types of persons who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that a child born in the United States to Chinese parents acquired U.S. citizenship even though the parents were, at the time, racially ineligible for naturalization. The Court also concluded that: “The 14th Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.” Id. at 693. Pursuant to this ruling: (a) Acquisition of U.S. citizenship generally is not affected by the fact that the parents may be in the United States temporarily or illegally; and that; and (b) A child born in an immigration detention center physically located in the United States is considered to have been born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. This is so even if the child’s parents have not been legally admitted to the United States and, for immigration purposes, may be viewed as not being in the United States. Wong Kim Ark, found that while the 14th amendment clearly declares birthright citizenship, the idea comes from an idea that existed in colonial times, that prevailed at the time it was adopted and ratified. As the Court said at 169 U.S. at 676: As appears upon the face of the amendment, as well as from the history of the times, this was not intended to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship, or to prevent any person from becoming citizens by the fact of birth within the United States, who would thereby have become citizens according to the law existing before its adoption. It is declaratory in form, and enabling and extending in effect. Its main purpose was, as has been often recognized by this court, to establish the citizenship of free negroes, which had been denied in the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v Sandford (1857) 19 How 393, and to put it beyond doubt that all blacks, as well as whites, born or naturalized within the jurisdiction of the United States are citizens of the United States. Citations omitted. Thus, the Court established that Dred Scott was wrongly decided. Moreover, the common rule of birthright citizenship was found to be a constitutional right that could not be changed by statute. Donald Trump, however, suggested that unnamed legal scholars believe that birthright citizenship may not apply to the children of aliens residing in the United States without proper documentation. This argument apparently hinges upon an interpretation of the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the 14th Amendment. The unnamed legal scholars mentioned by Trump clearly have not read Wong Kim Ark. The Court determined that persons born in an area under the control of the monarch owed their allegiance to the monarch and were also deemed protected by the monarch; that is the essence of citizenship: The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was the allegiance ….or “power” of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King’s allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual … [and] were predictable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children born in England, of such aliens, were therefore natural born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born and during within their hostile occupation of parts of the King’s dominions, were not natural born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said this day, within the jurisdiction of the King. Wong Kim Ark at 655. Emphasis added. This clearly sets forth that when the 14th Amendment was adopted, the framers of the amendment meant the term ”subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States to have the same meaning as in common law; that is, people within the geographic power of the king and who therefore owed allegiance to the king. Trump and his followers should recall Afroyim v. Rusk , 387 U.S. 253 (1967) which analyzed a different area of citizenship but made the point that: Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under the name of one of its implied grants of power. … The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.. Id at 268 In other words, Congress has no express power under the Constitution to strip a person of citizenship, and no such power can be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty, as was recognized by Congress before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 256-57. “The Constitution, of course, grants Congress no express power to strip people of their citizenship, whether in the exercise of the implied power to regulate foreign affairs or in the exercise of any specifically granted power.” Id. The Supreme Court applied the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to undocumented school-age children who had been denied a free public education by the State of Texas. In doing so the Court directly addressed the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the 14th Amendment: In appellants’ view person who have entered the United States illegally are not “within the jurisdiction” of a State even if they are present within the State’s boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that construction…. Plyler v. Doe , 457 U.S. 202, 211 (1982)

It is now clear the criminal system all too frequently makes mistakes. By mistake I am referring to a conviction which has been shown to be wrong by exoneration. exoneration occurs when a person who has been convicted of a crime is officially cleared after new evidence of innocence becomes available. As of February 25, 2024, the National Registry of Exonerations has recorded 3,478 exonerations in the United States from 1989 through the end of 2023. THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS REPORT (MARCH 18, 2024), chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/2023%20Annual%20Report.pdf Even one exoneration casts a reasonable doubt on the integrity of the criminal system. This situation has become such a concern that October 2 has been designated as International Wrongful Conviction Day. A terrible cost of wrongful convictions is the loss of irreplaceable years behind bars. Persons exonerated in 2023 lost an average of 14.6 years to wrongful imprisonment for crimes they did not commit—2,230 years in total. Importantly, official misconduct occurred in at least 118 exonerations in 2023. Official misconduct means police, prosecutors, or other government officials significantly abused their authority or the judicial process in a manner that contributed to the exoneree's conviction. 75 homicide cases—85% of homicide exonerations in 2023—were marred by official misconduct. Nearly 84 percent of exonerations last year (127/153) were persons of color. Nearly 61 percent of the exonerees (93/153) were Black. 50 exonerations in 2023 were for convictions based at least in part on mistaken witness identifications. 43 cases involved forensic evidence that was false or misleading. 32 exonerations involved false confessions (YES PEOPLE CONFESS TO CRIMES THEY DO NOT COMMIT). A confession is false when a statement is made to law enforcement at any point during the proceedings which was interpreted or presented by law enforcement as an admission of participation in or presence at the crime, even if the statement was not presented at trial. A statement is not a confession if it was made to someone other than law enforcement. A statement that is not at odds with the defense is not a confession. A guilty plea is not a confession.

Can the government make wearing a hat the wrong way a criminal offense? I have a case where a kid wore his baseball hat to the right in a park. The police arrested him for disorderly conduct. Is such an arrest valid? In Wisconsin, the power to arrest must be authorized by statute. City of Madison v. Two Crow , 88 Wis. 2d 156, 159, 276 N.W. 2d 359 (Ct. App. 1979). Under Wisconsin Statutes, a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person is committing or has committed a crime. § 968.07 (1)(d), Wis. Stats. Case law has interpreted the phrase “ reasonable grounds” to be the equivalent of probable cause. Ball v. State , 57 Wis. 2d 653,659, 205 N.W.2d 353 (1973); State v. Paszek , 50 Wis. 2d 619, 624, 184 N.W. 2d 836 (1971). Probable cause to arrest is “... that quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe the defendant probably committed a crime.” Ball , 57 Wis. 2d at 659, quoting, State v. Doyle , 40 Wis. 2d 461,466,162 N.W. 2d 60 (1968); Molina v. State , 53 Wis. 2d 662,671,193 N.W. 2d 874 (1972). Probable cause is, therefore, the sine qua non of a reasonable or lawful arrest. Dunaway v. New York , 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979). This quantum of evidence must be more than an officer’s subjective good faith belief or suspicion. Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 682-83, 207 N.W. 2d 589 (1973). While the evidence need not be the same quantum to justify a conviction, the evidence of guilt must amount to more than a mere possibility of guilt. State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565,572-73, 182 N.W. 2d 466 (1971). Without probable cause, therefore, an arrest is arbitrary and contrary to the “paramount purpose” of the Fourth Amendment. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 417 (1974). The test of whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence is whether the arresting officer could have obtained an arrest warrant on the basis of the information known prior to the arrest. Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W. 2d 116 (1976). In this case the police officer may have a subjective good faith belief or suspicion of criminal activity, but that is not probable cause to make an arrest. The criminality of a defendant cannot be made to turn upon a policemen’s suspicion or his satisfaction with the citizen’s account of himself (note that the burden is put on the citizen to explain his presence or his actions) or his view of what is orderly or disorderly, the statutes or ordinances in question delegate to the policemen too much power over the citizen’s liberty-the citizen is subjected to the discretion, be it arbitrarily exercised or not, of the policemen as to whether his actions are to be, in the given case, classified as criminal. City of Dayton v. Allen , 28 Ohio Misc. 181, 271 N.E. 2d 574, 577 (Ohio 1971). Emphasis added Wearing a hat sideways is simply not criminal. Nor could such conduct ever be criminal in a democratic America. What we wear is a part of who we are: The body is the innermost part of the material Self in each of us; and certain parts of the body seem more intimately ours than the rest. The clothes come next. The old saying that the human person is composed of three parts—soul, body and clothes—is more than a joke. We so appropriate our clothes and identify ourselves with them that there are few of us who, if asked to choose between having a beautiful body clad in raiment perpetually shabby and unclean, and having an ugly and blemished form always spotlessly attired, would not hesitate a moment before making a decisive reply.1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 292 (1890). Wearing a baseball cap is the type of conduct is constitutionally protected. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student wearing black arm band on sleeve in school is constitutionally protected speech). There was considerable debate in colonial America about what rights should be specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See, Hamilton, Madison, Jay, The Federalist Papers, (1961) Chap. 38, 84; Jefferson, T., On Democracy (Saul K. Padover e.d. 1939) p.47. During the 1789 Congressional debates, there was much discussion about whether the right of assembly should be mentioned in the Bill of Rights. Brant, I., The Bill of Rights (1965) p.53-67. It was in the midst of this discussion that Congressman Benson of New York stated this right should be included so that it could not be infringed upon by the government. Congressman Sedgwick of Massachusetts responded by stating: If the committee were governed by that general principle... they might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased... but [I] would ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a declaration of rights, in a Government where none of them were intended to be infringed.” Id., at 54- 55. Emphasis added. Therefore, court’s have found that one’s personal appearance is deserving of constitutional protection. Peppies-Courtesy Cab Co. v. City of Kenosha , 165 Wis. 2d 397; 475 N.W.2d 156 (1991) (ordinance requiring cab drivers to cut hair unconstitutional); Breen v. Kahl , 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969) (personal hair length is personal freedom protected by the United States Constitution). This conduct is like members of the National Socialist Party who wish to parade through a predominately Jewish community in uniforms reminiscent of those worn by members of the German Nazi Party while saluting the swastika. While distasteful, such conduct is, and must always be, constitutionally protected. Collin v. Smith , 447 F.Supp. 676 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 578 F. 2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). As in the case of the uniformed Nazis saluting and marching through Skokie, the presumed conduct of my client is constitutionally protected. My client’s conduct does not therefore allow a police officer to reasonably suspect my client of a crime based upon that conduct. Because a police officer cannot reasonably suspect my client of a crime based upon such conduct, an officer cannot make a valid stop based upon this conduct. See, §968.24; Wisconsin Law Enforcement Officers Criminal Law Handbook, at 43, 44.